Abstract-In this work, we study the bidirectional broadcast channel with common and confidential messages and establish the capacity-equivocation and secrecy capacity regions. This problem is motivated by the concept of bidirectional relaying in a threenode network, where a relay node establishes a bidirectional communication between two other nodes using a decode-andforward protocol and thereby efficiently integrates additional common and confidential services.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent research developments show that the concept of bidirectional relaying has the potential to significantly improve the overall performance and coverage in wireless networks. This is mainly based on the fact that the property of bidirectional communication can efficiently be exploited to reduce the inherent loss in spectral efficiency induced by half-duplex relays [1, 2] . It applies to three-node networks, where a halfduplex relay node establishes a bidirectional communication between two other nodes using a decode-and-forward protocol [3] [4] [5] . This is also known as two-way relaying.
Furthermore, already current cellular system operators offer not only traditional services such as (bidirectional) voice communication, but also additional multicast services or confidential services that are subject to certain secrecy constraints. Nowadays, this is realized by allocating different services on different logical channels and further applying secrecy techniques on higher levels. But there is a trend to merge coexisting services efficiently from an information theoretic point of view such that they work on the same wireless resources. This is referred to as physical layer service integration.
Secrecy techniques on higher layers are usually based on the assumption of insufficient computational capabilities of nonlegitimated receivers. Thus, physical-layer secrecy techniques are becoming more and more attractive since they do not rely on such assumptions and therefore provide so-called unconditional security. In the seminal work [6] Wyner introduced the wiretap channel which characterizes the secure communication problem for a point-to-point link with an eavesdropper. Csiszár and Körner generalized this to the broadcast channel Decode-and-forward bidirectional relaying. In the initial MAC phase, nodes 1 and 2 transmit their messages m 1 and m 2 with rates R 2 and R 1 to the relay node. Then, in the BBC phase, the relay forwards the messages m 1 and m 2 and adds a common message m 0 with rate R 0 and a confidential message mc for node 1 with rate Rc to the communication which should be kept as secret as possible from node 2.
with confidential messages in [7] . Recently, there has been growing interest in physical-layer secrecy, cf. for example [8] . Besides the (wireless) point-to-point link [6, 9, 10] , there are extensions to multi-user settings as the multiple access channel with confidential messages [11] , the interference channel with confidential messages [12] , the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel with common and confidential messages [13] , or the two-way wiretap channel [14, 15] .
In this work, we consider bidirectional relaying where the relay node integrates additional common and confidential services within such a network. We concentrate on the broadcast phase where the relay has successfully decoded the two individual messages the nodes have sent in the previous multiple access (MAC) phase. In addition to the transmission of both individual messages the relay node has the following tasks as shown in Figure 1 : the transmission of a common message to both nodes and further the transmission of a confidential message to one node, which should be kept as secret as possible from the other, non-legitimated node. Since the receiving nodes can use their own messages from the previous phase for decoding, this channel differs from the classical broadcast channel scenario and is therefore called bidirectional broadcast channel (BBC) with common and confidential messages. Note that this differs from the wiretap scenario where the bidirectional communication itself should be secure from eavesdroppers outside the wireless network as for example studied in [16, 17] . 
II. BIDIRECTIONAL BROADCAST CHANNEL WITH COMMON AND CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGES
Let X and Y i , i = 1, 2, be finite input and output sets. Then for input and output sequences x n ∈ X n and y n i ∈ Y n i , i = 1, 2, of length n, the discrete memoryless broadcast channel is given by W ⊗n (y
We do not allow any cooperation between the receiving nodes so that it is sufficient to consider the marginal transition probabilities W
We consider the standard model with a block code of arbitrary but fixed length n. The set of individual messages of node i, i = 1, 2, is denoted by
is also known at the relay node. Further, the sets of common and confidential messages of the relay node are denoted by
We make use of the abbreviation
In the bidirectional broadcast (BBC) phase, we assume that the relay has successfully decoded both individual messages m 1 ∈ M 1 and m 2 ∈ M 2 that nodes 1 and 2 transmitted in the previous multiple access (MAC) phase. Besides both individual messages the relay additionally transmits a common message m 0 ∈ M 0 to both nodes and a confidential message m c ∈ M c to node 1, which should be kept as secret as possible from the non-legitimated node 2.
2 )-code for the BBC with common and confidential messages consists of one (stochastic) encoder at the relay node
and decoders at nodes 1 and 2
where the element 0 in the definition of the decoders plays the role of an erasure symbol and is included for convenience.
Secure communication may benefit from randomized encoding [7, 8] so that we allow the encoder f to be stochastic. More precisely, the codeword x n ∈ X n used to transmit message m = (m c , m 0 , m 1 , m 2 ) ∈ M is specified by conditional probabilities f (x n |m) with x n ∈X n f (x n |m) = 1. When the relay has sent the message m = (m c , m 0 , m 1 , m 2 ), and nodes 1 and 2 have received y n 1 and y n 2 , the decoder at node 1 is in error if
. Accordingly, the decoder at node 2 is in error if g 2 (y n 2 , m 2 ) = (m 0 , m 1 ). Then, the average probability of error at node i, i = 1, 2 is given by
The ignorance of the non-legitimated node 2 about the confidential message m c ∈ M c is measured by the concept of equivocation rate. Here, the equivocation rate
characterizes the secrecy level of the confidential message. The higher the equivocation rate, the more ignorant is node 2 about the confidential message.
Definition 2: A rate-equivocation tuple
+ is said to be achievable for the BBC with common and confidential messages if for any δ > 0 there is an n(δ) ∈ N and a sequence of (n, M
2 )-codes such that for all n ≥ n(δ) we have
while µ
The set of all achievable rateequivocation tuples defines the capacity-equivocation region of the BBC with common and confidential messages and is denoted by C BBC .
Remark 1: The secrecy condition (1) is also referred to as weak secrecy which is based on the fact that the information the non-legitimated node receive is small in terms of the rate. This does not imply that the absolute amount of information is also small. Therefore, this concept includes the case where the non-legitimated node might have partial knowledge about the confidential message. There exist a stronger version where (1) is strengthened by dropping the division by n. For details we refer for example to [9, 10, 18] . Now we are in the position to present the capacityequivocation region of the BBC with common and confidential messages which is the main result of this work.
Theorem 1: The capacity-equivocation region C BBC of the BBC with common and confidential messages is the set of rateequivocation tuples (R c , R e , R 0 ,
and joint probability distribution P U (u)P V|U (v|u)P X|V (x|v)W (y 1 , y 2 |x). The cardinalities of the ranges of U and V can be bounded by
Theorem 1 immediately establishes the secrecy capacity region C S BBC of the BBC with common and confidential messages that is given by the set of all rate tuples (R c , R 0 , R 1 , R 2 ) ∈ R 4 + for which (R c , R c , R 0 , R 1 , R 2 ) ∈ C BBC holds. 
for random variables (U, V, X, Y 1 , Y 2 ) ∈ U × V × X × Y 1 × Y 2 and joint probability distribution P U (u)P V|U (v|u)P X|V (x|v)W (y 1 , y 2 |x). Fig. 2 . The available resources of each link are split up into two parts: one designated for the common and bidirectional communication (gray) and one for the confidential message (white). Since Rc ≥ I(X; Y 1 |U), the confidential message need some resources of the common communication.
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Theorem 1 is proved in the following two sections which present the proof of achievability and the weak converse.
III. ACHIEVABILITY
Here, we present a coding strategy that achieves the desired rates with the required secrecy level. Fortunately, we are able to use the codebook design that was presented in [19] for the BBC with confidential messages (and no common message). i) There exists a set of codewords u
and (n) → 0 as n → ∞. Thereby, λ 1 (m 0 , m 2 |m 1 ) denotes the probability that node 1 decodes (m 0 , m 2 ) ∈ M 0 × M 2 incorrectly if m 1 ∈ M 1 is given. The probability of error λ 2 (m 0 , m 1 |m 2 ) for node 2 is defined accordingly.
ii) For each u n m ∈ U n there exists a set of codewords
and (n) → 0 as n → ∞. Here, λ 1 (j, l|m ) is the probability that node 1 decodes j ∈ J or l ∈ L incorrectly if m ∈ M is known. Similarly, λ 2 (j|l, m ) is the probability that node 2 decodes j ∈ J incorrectly if (l, m ) ∈ L × M are given.
This codebook reveals a specific structure with two layers. The first layer corresponds to a codebook that already enables
Since Rc < I(X; Y 1 |U), there are more resources for the confidential message available than needed. This allows the relay to enable a stochastic encoding strategy which exploits all the available resources by introducing a mapping from J to K. the relay to transmit (bidirectional) individual messages and a common message, while the second layer is used for the transmission of the confidential message.
Next, we define suitable encoder and decoders for the BBC with common and confidential messages which map the confidential, common, and individual messages in an appropriate way into the codebook of Lemma 1.
are achievable for the BBC with common and confidential messages.
Proof:
For given rate-equivocation tuple (R c , R e , R 0 , R 1 , R 2 ) ∈ R 5 + that satisfy (2a)-(2c) we have to construct message sets, encoder, and decoders with
and further, cf. also (1),
The construction is an extension of [19] by further integrating the common message and is mainly based on an idea of [7] . In the following we have to distinguish between two cases as shown in Figures 2 and 3 .
If R c ≥ I(X; Y 1 |U), cf. Figure 2 , the set of confidential messages is given by
where J and L are chosen according to Lemma 1 and K is an arbitrary set such that (3a) holds. The sets M 1 = M 1 , M 2 = M 2 , and M 0 = M 0 × K are chosen such that (3b)-(3c) are satisfied. The deterministic encoder f maps the confidential message (j, l, k) ∈ M c , and the common and individual messages m i ∈ M i , i = 0, 1, 2, into the codeword x n jlm ∈ X n with m = (m 0 , m 1 , m 2 ) with m 0 = (m 0 , k) and
If R c < I(X; Y 1 |U), cf. Figure 3 , the set of confidential messages is given by M c := K × L where K is arbitrary 2011 IEEE Information Theory Workshop chosen such that (3a) is satisfied. In addition, we define a mapping h : J → K which partitions the set J into subsets of "nearly equal size" [7] , i.e.,
The sets M i = M i , i = 0, 1, 2, are arbitrary such that (3b)-(3c) are satisfied. The stochastic encoder f maps the confidential message (k, l) ∈ M c and the common and individual messages m i ∈ M i , i = 0, 1, 2, into the codeword x n jlm ∈ X n with m = (m 0 , m 1 , m 2 ) and m i = m i , i = 0, 1, 2. The index j is uniformly drawn from the set h −1 (k) ⊂ J . In both cases the decoders are immediately determined by the codebook design from Lemma 1. It remains to show that the equivocation rate fulfills (4) . Since the confidential message is encoded in the same way as in [19] for the BBC with confidential messages (and no common message), we omit the details for brevity.
Once we have established the achievable rate-equivocation region in Lemma 2, it is straightforward to show that this region equals the capacity-equivocation region stated in Theorem 1. Since the argumentation follows exactly the one presented in [19] or [7] we omit the details for brevity.
IV. WEAK CONVERSE
We have to show that for any given sequence of
are satisfied. For this purpose we need a version of Fano's lemma suitable for the BBC with common and confidential messages. Lemma 3 (Fano's inequality): For the BBC with common and confidential messages we have the following versions of Fano's inequality
The lemma can be shown analogously as in [3, 20] , where similar versions of Fano's inequality for the BBC (without confidential messages) are presented. Therefore, we omit the details for brevity.
For notational convenience we introduce the following ab-
, the chain rule for entropy, the definition of mutual information, Fano's inequality, cf. Lemma 3, and the chain rule for mutual information we get for the entropies of the individual and common messages
and similarly
For the entropy of the confidential message we obtain 
